

The Changing Gender Gap(s) in Voting: An Occupational Realignment

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Abstract

In a dramatic reversal from five decades ago, in most Western democracies today, women support left-leaning parties at higher rates than men. We explain this change on the left by analyzing it jointly with the rise of the radical right and focusing on men's vote. We contend that occupational vulnerability to immigration led manual workers, most of whom are men, to abandon the left and support the radical right at disproportionately high rates. Furthermore, this effect is contingent on economic positions of parties both on the left and the radical right. Drawing on public opinion data from 18 countries over a 46 year period, labor data on skills required in different sectors, and party positions, we conduct both aggregate and individual-level analyses. We find that realignment of the vote along occupational lines in a gender-segregated labor market is at the heart of the change in the gender gap in voting.

Keywords: gender gap, voter behavior, left, radical right, occupational vulnerability.

Word count: 11,980

1. Introduction

In recent years, women are a well-defined constituency on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, women support left-leaning and progressive parties at higher rates than men (e.g., Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), and similarly, in the US, women's positions on issues are more progressive and their partisanship is more heavily Democratic than that of men (e.g., Edlund and Pande 2002). This tendency is so broadly evident that it is often reified. Yet up until the 1990s, the opposite was the case: these were men in advanced industrialized democracies who tended to support the left at higher rates (see, e.g., Giger 2009). And while ample evidence suggests that women drifted to the left overtime (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004), studies also suggest that social democratic parties have suffered decline in mass support (e.g., Benedetto et al. 2020).

We investigate this change in the gender gap in support for the left in the context of European multi-party systems. In particular, we reconcile the tension between the two trends by analyzing this regularity in conjunction with perhaps the most dramatic change in mass politics in Europe in recent decades: the rise of the radical right. While the two phenomena have been extensively studied separately, studying them jointly allows us to reach new insights.

Furthermore, unlike most studies analyzing the change in the gender gap, we focus on the change in voter behavior of men.

We contend that occupational vulnerability to immigration and trade is a driving force to this change, and that the livelihood of those working in jobs that require manual rather than

communication skill dexterity -- most of whom are men -- is particularly in peril. These workers shift their support from the mainstream left to the radical right that presents itself as a guardian to dislocated interests of manual workers. Additionally, we hold that these effects are contingent on the economic positions endorsed by the left and the radical right. Where the left holds on to its traditional values, greater male domination of the manual labor market will be associated with greater support for the left by men. This is not the case, however, where the left and the radical right each gravitate toward the center. Our puzzle of the realignment of the vote along gender lines is therefore answered by an occupational realignment that takes place in a gender-segregated labor market.

We utilize public opinion data in 18 democracies over a 46 year period (the Eurobarometer and European Social Survey between 1970-2002 and 2002-2016, respectively), along with labor data about skills relevant for different jobs, and party placement data (the Chapel Hill Expert Survey). To the best of our knowledge, this analysis of the electoral gender gap is the most extensive in scope undertaken to date. Our analysis is three pronged. We first establish a bird's eye view of aggregate trends of the gender gaps and their relationships, highlighting voting trends of manual workers. We next conduct individual-level analysis, focusing on the effect of skills. Lastly, we revisit the gender gap and focus on the combined effect of gender-segregation of the labor market and party placements. Our results support our hypotheses.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews accounts of the gender gap on

the left and on the radical right. The following section develops our hypotheses. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 4. The final section concludes.

2. The gender gap(s): Accounts and questions left

2.1 Change over time

Students of both gender and electoral politics have long established two stylized facts with respect to the gender gap in political attitudes as well as in voting. First, compared with men, women in Western democracies support progressive policies and vote for left-leaning and progressive parties at higher rates ('the modern gender gap', e.g., Edlund and Pande 2002, Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). Second, about five decades ago, in the 1970s, the gender gap in voting was in the opposite direction. Men were the ones to support left-leaning parties at higher rates, while women tended to support conservative parties ('the traditional gender gap'). A secular trend in the gender gap led to the narrowing of the traditional gap and in most countries to its reversal (e.g., Giger 2009, Inglehart and Norris 2000).

Studies of the electoral gender gap ascribe the drift of women to the left to one of two (related) sets of factors. The first is structural and holds that women's interests have changed along with the rise in female participation in the labor force (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1998), their employment in the public sector (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004), and changes in the family structure due to the possibility of divorce (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). The second examines how changes in values and political culture bring about change in political behavior (see, e.g.,

Inglehart and Norris's (2000, 2003) theory of a rise in post-material values, and Greenberg (2001) on the effect of secularization).

While scholars are in agreement that women secularly drifted to the left overtime, it is not the case that the left has been secularly gaining support overtime. In fact, alternation of power between left-leaning and right-leaning parties and even decline in support for the left overtime have been a commonplace (see, e.g., Benedetto et al. 2020, Rennwald and Pontusson 2020). It is likely the case, therefore, that alongside the shift of women to the left there has been a shift of men away from the left. To the best of our knowledge, however, few studies analyzing the gender gap focus on men's voting behavior, and those that do, study it in the context of the US two-party system (see Norrander 1999 for analysis of men's vote in the South and Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999 for analysis of salience men and women assign to different considerations).

2.2 The gender gap in support for the radical right

Perhaps the most dramatic phenomenon in mass behavior in Europe in the past several decades has been the rise of the radical right. Taking different ideological forms (e.g., neo-fascist, populist) and focusing on both domestic policy of immigration and foreign policy vis-a-vis the European Union, radical right parties have acquired high levels of support and have gradually infiltrated mainstream politics.

Analyses of support for the radical right have found that it enjoys support of men more than that of women (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007, Givens 2004, 2005, Harteveld and

Ivarsflaten 2018, Van der Brug and Fennema 2007). Studies offer different accounts for this regularity. According to some, the hierarchical and usually male-dominated structure of radical right parties tends to attract more male supporters than female ones (Kitschelt and McGann 1997). An additional explanation focuses on the antifeminist agenda promoted by many radical right parties (Mayer 1998). Yet another explanation highlights the fact that often women do not differ from men in relevant policy positions (e.g., immigration) but they possess a stronger need to control prejudice which in turn hinders their tendency to support the radical right (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2018). Lastly, the ethics of caring, including sympathy for the disadvantaged catalyzed by feminist consciousness (Conover 1988) may pull women away from radical right parties.

A general analysis of the rise in support for the radical right is not within the scope of our analysis. Importantly, our goal is not to adjudicate between key explanations for the general rise in support for the radical right, most notably culturalist theories and interest based/structuralist ones -- in fact, our empirical analysis incorporates elements from both these approaches. The discussion here focuses on explanations that are directly relevant to analyzing *the gender gap* in support for the radical right, and as we will show, assist in understanding the change in the *gender gap* in support for the left.

The culturalist approach focuses on symbols, values, and identity as predictors of support for the radical right in general and anti-immigrant sentiments in particular. In a comparative study of European democracies, Sides and Citrin (2007) find that individuals' attitudes toward

immigration are affected by national identity and in particular preference for cultural homogeneity. More generally, in their analytic review, Hainmeuller and Hopkins (2014) contend that attitudes on immigration can be systematically explained by cultural sentiments rather than economic interests. Another strand of this literature argues that supporters of radical right parties often feel that traditional values have been abandoned in current post-materialist cosmopolitan culture (Inglehart and Norris 2017).

The interest-based approach emphasizes the economic interests of native workers in shaping attitudes. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that, in the US, low-skill workers support restrictions on immigration more than their high-skill counterparts (although see Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit 2015, and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, who find no such evidence). This relationship, they show, does not systematically vary with the level of immigration to the community. In the European context, Ortega and Polavieja (2012) find that distinct from education, the degree of manual skill dexterity required in a native worker's occupation is positively correlated with anti-immigrant sentiments, and holding a job that requires high human capital is positively correlated with pro-immigrant attitudes (see also Polavieja 2016).

According to some within this strand of research, anti-immigrant sentiments promoted by radical right parties are framed to appeal to those who have lost out due to globalization, usually blue-collar male workers whose jobs have been put at risk by the influx of manual immigrant workers (Givens 2004, Jackman and Volpert 1996, Mayer 1998). Indeed, Hartevelde (2016) finds that radical right parties that adopt a centrist or center-left economic platform succeed in

attracting voters of low socio-economic status better than their counterparts on the radical right who do not do so¹.

3. Putting the two together: the electoral gender gap(s) in a changing party system

The observed reversal of the gender gap on the left, along with the rise in support for the radical right which is disproportionately championed by male voters calls for an examination of the two gender gaps as potentially linked. How does the change in voting behavior of men contribute to the change in the gender gap on the left?

3.1. Occupational vulnerability

Students of political economy have highlighted the importance of identifying the advantaged and disadvantaged in the labor market. Yet depending on focus, studies differ in both aspects of one's disadvantage they identify and their operationalization. Rueda (2005), for example, focuses on materialized hardship in individuals' current labor market status and defines outsiders as those who are either unemployed or hold low salary jobs. Häusermann and Schwander (2011) conceptualize outsiders as belonging to an occupational group that has above-average rates of unemployment.

¹ This is consistent with Schain's (2000) finding that supporters of the National Front are characterized by concern about unemployment compared to supporters of mainstream right parties.

Inspired by this framework and adapting it to the question at hand, we focus on occupational vulnerability of workers to immigration and trade in particular. Individuals working in sectors that require manual rather than communication skills are vulnerable to both competition with immigrant workers who possess manual skills and offshoring of their jobs due to trade. Language and communication skills, on the other hand, often serve as a security fence for native workers and present a labor-market barrier for immigrants.² We can thus think of manual vs. communication skills as indicators of occupational uncertainty at times of rapid globalization, trade and immigration, whereby the more (less) manual (communication) skill dexterity one's job requires, the more occupationally vulnerable one is.³

We classify workers by the skill dexterity required in the sector they work in and hence, we contend, the potential threat to their livelihood posed by immigration or trade. Manual workers might look for ways to offset that risk by supporting a party that explicitly promotes anti-immigrant rhetoric, opposes trade and presents itself as a fighter against these “external” threats. This approach allows us to capture a worker's vulnerability in the face of current *and* potential future shocks to the labor market. This logic resonates with recent work on the

² This is consistent with Peri and Sparber's (2011) finding of limited substitutability between highly educated immigrants and native workers.

³ Note that manual skills are differentiated from routine skills, a predictor of job vulnerability vis-a-vis automation (e.g., Kurer 2020, Thesissen and Rueda 2019).

importance of economic risk in shaping policy preferences and political behavior (Rehm 2016).

In particular, we hypothesize that:

H1a. Individuals working in sectors that require high manual skill dexterity are more likely to support the radical right compared to their counterparts working in sectors that do not require a high level of manual skills.

H1b. Individuals working in sectors that require high communication skill dexterity are less likely to support the radical right compared to their counterparts working in sectors that do not require a high level of communication skills.

While our first set of hypotheses focuses on the individual-level and links occupational vulnerability and vote choice, we now turn to contextualize it. Our next step specifies how positions of parties on the left and the radical right interact with labor market characteristics to affect the gender gap.

3.2 Political context: The gender gap, parties and labor markets

We contend that, under certain conditions, manual workers will be more likely to abandon the left, and given that more men than women work in manual jobs, this will in turn affect the gender gap on the left. We focus on two factors: the degree to which the manual labor market is gender segregated, and the economic position of the mainstream left and the radical right.

Although a coherent party family, some social democratic parties persistently promote

traditional social democratic macro-economic policies, while others have pursued centrist policies and third-way solutions or have shifted their efforts to other domains such as identity. The policy supported by the mainstream left, we propose, is relevant for vote shifting of manual workers. Where the mainstream left takes decidedly leftist positions, a greater number of men in position of occupational vulnerability will be associated with a greater number of men supporting the left, and thus the gender gap will be larger. Conversely, where mainstream left parties take centrist policy positions, greater male domination of the manual labor market will be associated with a smaller gender gap -- i.e., with fewer men than women who support the left. This relationship will be observed where the radical right is a viable alternative for voters, but not otherwise. Under the latter, neither the economic position of the mainstream left nor the gender segregation of the manual labor market will be associated with a particular change of the gender gap in support for the left. Therefore, where the radical right is a viable alternative:

H2. where mainstream left parties pursue leftist (centrist) economic positions, greater male domination of manual sectors will be associated with a larger (smaller) gender gap on the left.

In conjunction with changes in policies pursued by the mainstream left that may serve as push factors for some of its constituencies, radical right parties might play a role in pulling voters in their direction. While most radical right parties pursue anti-immigrant rhetoric and claim to guard workers' dislocated interests, some endorse decidedly laissez faire economic policies while others support state intervention in the economy (Mudde 2007). Indeed, in a study of ten radical right European parties, Harteveld (2016) finds that those endorsing redistribution tend to

win the support of pro-welfare nationalists, a group of voters often embedded in working class roots. Additionally, upper middle-class voters (measured in subjective terms) tend to support radical right parties that hold pro-market economic positions. We therefore expect *the combination* of positions of the two parties to play a role in encouraging or discouraging voters to shift their support. When both the left and the radical right take distinctly different positions, it is harder for voters to shift their support. When their respective positions are closer to the center, however, the combination of push and pull factors might make it easier for occupationally vulnerable (male) voters to shift their support. Combined with gender-segregation of manual sectors, we thus hypothesize that:

H3. where the mainstream left and the radical right pursue relatively similar (different) economic positions, greater male domination of manual sectors will be associated with a smaller (greater) gender gap.

In the next section we empirically examine these hypotheses.

4. Empirical strategy: The gender gap on the left and on the radical right

Our starting point (which we establish empirically below) is that the gender gap on the left in Europe has secularly changed from a traditional gap to a modern gap such that to date, women support left leaning parties at higher rates than men (Giger 2009). The study of large overtime drifts in voter behavior in a multiparty system poses challenges not present in the two-party context. Many potential drifts may take place simultaneously, making it difficult to

empirically isolate the realignment of a particular group. While due to data limitations we are unable to trace individual votes and follow them over decades ‘wherever they went’, in the below three-pronged empirical analysis, we show that as a group men holding manual jobs realigned compared to the general population.

We begin with a broad-brush analysis of a 46-year aggregate trends in a cross-section of countries. We focus on the gender gap on the left and the radical right, as well as the rate of support for the two among male and female manual workers. Informed by these analyses, in the second part we shift to an individual-level analysis of support for the radical right drawing on ESS data (2002-2016), highlighting the effect of gender and skill. Lastly, we contextualize our findings in the first two sections, analyzing the contingency of the gender gap on the gender segregation of the manual labor market and the economic positions of mainstream left and radical right parties.

4.1. Data and measurement

Public opinion and vote choice. To conduct our analysis, we draw on several sources of data. For public opinion data, we utilize Eurobarometer (hereafter EB) data between 1970-2002 as well as eight waves of the European Social Survey (hereafter ESS) between 2002-2016, providing us public opinion data from forty-six years altogether. The former includes five countries from 1970 and quickly turns into nine in 1973, and then gradually grows in scope as more countries join the EU, reaching respondents from sixteen countries in the 2002 wave and a

total of 339 country/year samples, while the latter includes eighteen countries in all waves with a total of 119 country/year samples (for details regarding the countries sampled in each wave see Appendix A).⁴

To evaluate the gender gap, we first sorted parties that obtained at least a single parliamentary seat in the elections immediately following the survey into party families. To do so, we pooled four classifications of party families that once combined cover the time range of 1970-2016. Specifically, we drew on (i) Armingeon et al. (2009), (ii) Laver et al.(2011), (iii) Norris (2005) (the latter classifies radical right parties only), and (iv) the ParlGov data set. While the first three sources usually cover the period of 1970-2002, the classifications by ParlGov and Laver et al. cover most of our data between 2002-2016 (for further details on party classification see Appendix B).

Having sorted parties to families, we proceeded to focus on two party families: the left and the radical right. The left includes socialist, social democratic, and left-socialist parties. The radical right includes radical right, right wing, populist, protest, far right, and neo-fascist parties. We then coded each respondent's vote choice employing dummy variables that correspond with these two families (with a total of 223,858 positive scores for the left and 18,218 positive scores for the radical right). We calculated vote-shares of the two party families for each country/year. Finally, and consistent with previous studies, we defined the gender gap for every party family as

⁴ Note that vote choice is not asked in the Eurobarometer as of 2002.

the proportion of men supporting a particular party family minus the proportion of women supporting that same party family.⁵

Skills. For our analysis of occupational vulnerability of native workers in the face of competition with immigrant workers, we utilize information about the degree to which different occupations require manual or communication skills. To do so, we classify each sector (first digit of ISCO code in our ESS data) by the degree to which it relies on manual or communication skills. This is done by utilizing and adapting D’Amuri and Peri (2014) categorization of O*NET characterization of occupations. We also adapt EB occupational categorization and match it with the appropriate ESS category (see Appendix C for detailed description). Thus, sectors requiring tasks such as oral comprehension, oral expression, speech clarity, written comprehension and written expression score high on communication skills while those requiring wrist-finger speed and trunk strength score high on manual skills.

Economic positions of parties. To measure economic positions of left and radical right parties, we utilize the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). The economic left-right item runs from 0 to 10, where parties on the lower end of the scale ‘want government to play an active role in the economy’ and those on the upper end ‘emphasize reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state’ (Bakker et al. 2014). The 2010 wave was cross-

⁵ Throughout our analysis, we screen for self-reported turnout in the last elections.

validated with alternative sources of party positioning information by Bakker and his colleagues, who conclude that ‘party experts in Europe view the left/right economic dimension of party competition in largely the same way across countries’ (2014: 1100). Scores range from 1.5 to 5 on the left and 4 to just above 8 for the radical right.

Gender segregation of the manual labor market. To measure gender segregation of manual sectors we subtracted the number of women working in the three most manual sectors from the number of men in them and divided the difference by the total number of manual workers (ESS 2002-2016). Theoretically, it varies from -1 (perfect female domination) to +1 (perfect male domination), with 0 representing a perfectly even distribution. Empirically, all manual sectors in our data were found to be male dominated (Portugal 2012 and 2016 are exceptions with scores of -0.14 and -0.08, respectively), with Sweden (2008) scoring the highest (0.62), indicating that four in five employees in manual sectors are men.


5 Empirical analysis

5.1 Gender gaps: aggregate trends


We begin our empirical investigation with an examination of the gender gap overtime. Figure 1a presents the trend of the gender gap for the left over time. The combination of the EB survey (1970-2002) and ESS (2002-2016) allows for a forty-six year trend with five to sixteen and eighteen Western European countries surveyed at any single point, respectively. The EB is run twice (and in some cases thrice) a year (and collapsed to a single annual dataset in the

longitudinal file) and the ESS is run biennially. The figure presents the gender gap for the left party family on the vertical axis such that a positive gender gap indicates that men support the left at a higher rate than women do (traditional gap). The aggregate trend depicted in the figure shows a secular trend from a traditional gap to a modern one whereby women support left-leaning parties at higher rates than men do. Cross-country variation in pace of change notwithstanding, with the exception of Spain, all countries exhibit a trend in the same direction (see Giger 2009 for similar findings) and by the mid 1990's an overwhelming majority of countries exhibit a modern gender gap. Having established this trend, we shift now to examining the gender gap for the radical right.

Figure 1. The gender gap on the left: 1970-2016



(a)




(b)

Note. Parties included in the left party family are: socialist, social democratic, left-socialist. See Appendix B for more information about party classifications. Trendline is a polynomial regression of the gender gap on year, weighted by country. In panel (b), country-years in red are those where radical right parties attained at least a single parliamentary seat.

Figure 2 presents the gender gap for the radical right across countries and over time (1970-2016). On the vertical axis is the gap for the radical right party family. Here, too, a positive gap implies that men support the radical right at a higher rate than women do. The aggregate trend reflected in the data indicates a clear pattern whereby men are consistently more likely to support radical right parties than women.

Figure 2. The gender gap on the radical right: 1970-2012



Note. Parties included in the radical right party family are: radical right, ultra-right, populist, protest, far right, and neo-fascist parties. See Appendix B for more information about party classifications.

Our preliminary analysis, therefore, shows that women tended to support left-leaning parties at lower rates than men, and that the gap secularly narrowed and reversed overtime. Additionally, we find that men tend to support the radical right (whose electoral fortune is increased overtime) at higher rates than women. A first step toward analyzing the link between the two regularities is comparing the gender gap for the left at the presence and absence of radical right. Our expectation is that the gender gap on the left will be smaller (“more modern”) in contexts in which radical right parties gained presence in parliament.

In Figure 1b we return to the gender gap on the left presented in Figure 1a but split the data into two sets of country-years: those in which the radical right did not acquire a seat in parliament (in black, aggregate and country-specific trendlines) and those in which it acquired at least a single seat (in red). This admittedly crude dichotomization presents a clear descriptive difference in voting behavior on the left between the two sets of cases. In contexts where radical right parties are strong enough to gain a parliamentary seat the gender gap on the left is smaller (“more modern”) and it flips signs (from traditional to modern) more than a decade earlier. In other words, in the former fewer men (or more women) support the left compared to the latter.

The analysis so far exhibits two broad-brush findings. First, the gender gap on the left changes overtime, and where the radical right is present it is more ‘modern’, and second, there is a gender gap in the opposite direction in support for the radical right. These merely descriptive empirical pieces, along with theories of support for radical right and anti-immigrant sentiments suggest that there is possibly a link between the gender gap on the left and support for the radical right.

5.2. Manual workers: aggregate trends

Recall that our argument holds that (a) occupational vulnerability due to immigration and trade in particular leads voters to rally around the radical right, and that (b) given the segregation of the labor market, men tend to hold jobs that are more vulnerable to these factors compared to women. In the next step, we focus aggregately on women and men holding manual jobs between 1970-2016. Specifically, utilizing the EB and ESS, we (a) compare the voting behavior of these groups to that of the general population, and (b) complement this analysis with an examination of the relative weight of these groups among supporters of the left and the radical right.

To do so, we first identify manual workers. We append the data for each respondent with the degree to which their job requires manual and communication skill dexterity. The two are measured in terms of percentiles: the score indicates the percentile of the sector in the economy in terms of use of the relevant skill such that high number indicates that workers in the sector use the skill with greater intensity compared to others (see Appendix C for sources and construction of these variables). Not surprisingly, the two are strongly and negatively correlated ($r = -0.98$). The fit is nearly perfect: the more a sector requires communication skills the less it requires manual skills.

Table 1 presents the ten sectors classified by ISCO along with examples of specific occupations and their percentiles on manual and communication skills. Sectors are organized in ascending order of manual skill dexterity with senior officials and managers (Sector 1) scoring

the highest on communication skill and the lowest on reliance on manual skills. At the bottom end of the list are the three most manual sectors: elementary occupations, immediately followed by craft workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers. In the analysis below we refer to workers in these three sectors (9, 7, and 8) as manual workers (the next sector in terms of use of manual skills is services which substantially differs from these three).⁶

The last column of Table 1 presents the share of male workers in each sector. Note the gender segregation of the manual sectors, with craft and plant and machine operators sectors being heavily dominated by men (seventy-nine and eighty-six percent, respectively). Elementary occupations, however, have more women than men due to occupations such as domestic helpers that are included in this category. Overall, while in many aspects of labor market segregation it is women who are disadvantaged compared to men (see, e.g., Sector 1), our argument about skill-based occupational vulnerability due to immigration and trade applies to men more than women.

⁶ Skill intensity scores are not available for skilled agricultural and fishery workers (3.82% of respondents) and armed forces (0.35%).

Table 1. Classification of sectors by skill dexterity

	Example Occupations	Manual skill percentile	Com. skill percentile	% men in sector
1. Legislators, senior officials and managers	Corp. managers, managers in restaurants and hotels	21.75	85.45	69
4. Clerks	Accounting and bookkeeping, secretaries	29.2	70.18	29
3. Technicians and associate professionals	Estate agents, medical assistants	37.83	67.42	47
2. Professionals	Computing professionals, lawyers	38.14	69.46	47
5. Service, shop and market sales workers	Cooks, police officers, waiters	38.61	64.46	29
9. Elementary occupations	Street vendors, domestic helpers, garbage collectors	71.19	29.86	37
7. Craft and related trades workers	Roofers, plumbers, sheet metal workers	75.32	18.1	86
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers	Plant operators, textile, fur and leather plant operators	78.23	21.11	80
6. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	Dairy and livestock producers, crop growers			

Note. Percentiles describe manual and communication skill intensity (Source: D'Amuri and Peri, 2014)

We begin by examination of the proclivity of women and men working in manual jobs to support the left overtime. For comparability with the analysis below, data in the figure are limited to country-years in which the radical right attained presence (at least a single seat) in parliament. As a reference point, the figure presents the vote-share for the left among the general population (in gray). Figure 3a shows that support for the left among both women and men holding manual jobs declines overtime, as is that of the general population, but the decline among men is steeper. Note that the trendlines for the two subsets (male and female manual workers who support the left) is calculated among the broader group of male and female manual workers. Thus, it is not about the relative size of each group in these sectors.


In Panel (b) we examine the *composition* of the left overtime and in particular the proportion of men holding a manual job (in red) and that of women holding similar jobs (in black) among left supporters. The figure shows two important things. First, men holding manual jobs are a larger sub-constituency among supporters of left parties compared to their female counterparts. This is consistent with the fact that more men are occupied in manual jobs compared to women (37% compared to 25% in the EB, and 35% compared to 16% in the ESS data). Second, both men and women holding manual jobs become less of a central constituency for left parties: their share among party supporters declines overtime, and that of men declines more steeply. And although regardless of their vote, the share of manual workers in the general population in advanced industrialized democracies declines overtime due to technological changes and global economic forces, the analogous analysis of the radical right presented next

suggests that this trend is not simply a product of the decline of this segment of the population.


Rather, it suggests an occurrence of an occupational and gender-based realignment of vote choice.

Figure 3. Support for the left: manual male workers and others

(a) Rate of support



(b) Composition




Note. (a) rate of support for left parties among men holding manual jobs (red), women holding manual jobs (black), as well as the general population (grey). (b) Male (red) and female (black) manual workers' share among supporters of the left. Manual workers are those who work in sectors 7, 8, and 9. Italy is excluded from the lefthand panel as the largest leftwing party is classified as radical left.


Figure 4 displays analogous patterns in the radical right. Panel (a) presents the rate of support for the radical right overtime among men and women who hold manual jobs (in red and black, respectively), as well as that of the overall sample (in gray). Consistent with common knowledge, the general trend is an increase in the vote-share of the radical right. This is also the trend among women and men holding manual jobs, at rates slightly higher than those of the general population. Panel (b) presents the share of men and women holding manual jobs among all supporters of the radical right overtime (in red and black, respectively). The figure shows a clear pattern by which overtime men holding manual jobs become a key constituency of the radical right relative to women. This pattern is particularly important in light of the decline in the share of men working in manual jobs on the left observed in Figure 3b.

Figure 4. Support for the radical right: manual male workers and others

(a) Rate of support



(b) Composition



Note. (a) rate of support for radical right parties among men holding manual jobs (red), women holding manual jobs (black), as well as the general population (grey). (b) Male (red) and female (black) manual workers' share among supporters of the radical right. Manual workers are those who work in sectors 7, 8, and 9.

The analysis above further links between the gender gap on the left and that on the radical right. It shows that manual workers abandoned left-wing parties as well as that they support the radical right at a rate greater than that of the general population. We turn next to examine the gender gap in support for the radical right and in particular the effect of occupational vulnerability on the vote and its relation to gender.

5.3. The gender gap in support for the radical right: Individual-level analysis

To investigate the effect of occupational vulnerability on the vote, we conduct an individual-level analysis of vote choice utilizing eight ESS waves (2002-2016). Our dependent variable is dichotomized, such that 1 indicates support for the radical right and 0 otherwise.

Recall that our first hypothesis linked the type of skill required in one's job (as a proxy for occupational vulnerability) to their vote choice. We thus include in the regression gender and skill dexterity (communication or manual). Our predictions, therefore, refer to the coefficients of the job market variables: we expect communication skills to have a negative effect on support for the radical right and manual skills to have a positive one. Gender in itself may still be a factor predicting support for the radical right due to some (or all) of the explanations mentioned above - it is not our specific prediction that the gender coefficient will be zero, nor is it our goal to nullify it.

Cultural factors. As mentioned above, we do not argue against cultural explanations for support of the radical right. In fact, we include in our analysis three items available from the ESS that measure anti-immigrant attitudes based on cultural/identity-based sentiments: (i)

agreement/disagreement that immigrants undermine country's cultural life, (ii) support for allowing immigrants of a race different from the country's majority, (iii) agreement/disagreement that immigrants make the country a worse place to live. We also include education (in years) (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), as well as the size/type of community in which one lives (a farm home in the countryside to a big city), which is a likely indicator of opportunities for contact with and exposure to immigrants as well as cosmopolitanism (Haubert and Fussell 2006).

Additionally, we include two items that measure interest-based immigration sentiments: (iv) support for allowing immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, and (v) agreement/disagreement that immigrants are bad for the country's economy. Both these items and the three cultural items are coded such that high values indicate higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Given the focus of our argument on occupational vulnerability, we also control for unemployment (specifically, has the respondent ever been unemployed for a period greater than three months), as well as union membership. Lastly, we control for age, religiosity, and whether one is native or foreign born.⁷ Appendix D reports question wording of all items used and Appendix E reports descriptive statistics.

⁷ We omit from the analysis Finland 2002, 2004, and 2006 in which the number of respondents reporting support for the radical right was smaller than 1 percent and did not allow for a meaningful multivariate estimation.

One might wonder why the number of immigrants per sector in any given country-year is not included on the right hand side. The reason is twofold. Theoretically, according to our argument, the penetration of immigrants to the sector is post-treatment to skill: it is affected by the degree to which communication vs. manual skills are required in the sector and thus should not be controlled for in the analysis. Empirically, studies show that the number of immigrants in one's surroundings does not necessarily predict anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

Table 2 presents the results drawing on all eight waves, including country and year fixed effects (results are similar across years, see Appendix F). As a reference, our first model includes only gender and control variables. The next three models include communication skill dexterity and control variables. While Model 2 omits anti-immigrant sentiments on the right hand side, Model 3 includes them. The results support our hypotheses. Requirement of communication skills in one's sector reduces the tendency to support the radical right in both models. Note that while gender alone has an effect on supporting the radical right in Model 1 (as expected, men support it at a higher rate than women do), this result is somewhat weakened in most following models.

Models 5 and 6 repeat this exercise with manual rather than communication skills. Here, too, we find support for our thesis. The more manual skill dexterity is required in one's job, the more likely she is to support the radical right. Across models, the coefficients on our control variables are as expected. Education, union membership, religiosity, and having born outside

one's country reduce the likelihood of supporting the radical right while being unemployed in the past increases it. Additionally, in most models, residing in an urban area reduces the likelihood of supporting the radical right. Lastly, where included, all anti-immigrant attitude items are positively correlated with support for the radical right.

As a complementary examination of our argument, we test a differential effect of skill and anti-immigrant attitudes on the vote for women and men. We first interact gender with skill. While a gender-differential effect of skill in supporting the radical right does not flatly contradict our theory, our argument leads us to think that the effect is driven by skill and gender segregation of the labor market rather than in a differential response of men and women to skill-related vulnerability. The *pooled* results of this analysis (Models 4 and 7) suggest that there is indeed an interactive effect, namely, that the effect of skill is stronger among men than it is among women. However, this result dissipates almost entirely when each of the eight rounds of the ESS is examined separately (see Appendix F). This result is consistent with our argument: while skill (and thus occupational vulnerability) *is* correlated with gender, men do not inherently differ from women in the magnitude of the effect of skill on vote choice.

We next combine the three cultural anti-immigrant items and the two economic ones to two scaled items.⁸ Our analysis shows statistically significant though substantively insignificant

⁸ Both the three cultural anti-immigrant items and the two economic ones are strongly correlated (α 's =0.80, and 0.64 respectively).

(in fact, miniscule) difference in anti-immigrant attitudes between the sexes. We also interact each of the two scales with gender and find that there is no gender differentiated effect of culturally based anti-immigrant attitudes on support for the radical right (Appendix F). Combined with the findings above on the effect of education and residing in rural vs. urban areas, we infer that while cultural considerations have an effect, this effect is not necessarily gender-specific.

We now turn to substantively evaluate the effect of one's position in the labor market on their choice to support the radical right.


Table 2. Support for the radical right (Probit Models, ESS 1-8)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.22*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)
Communication		-0.64*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.07)			
Male x communication				-0.21** (0.08)			
Manual					0.70*** (0.04)	0.43*** (0.04)	0.21** (0.07)
Male x manual							0.32*** (0.09)
Education (yrs.)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Population density	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)						
Age squared	-0.00 (0.00)						
Religiosity	-0.01*** (0.00)						
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
Foreign born	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.07*** (0.00)	0.08*** (0.00)		0.08*** (0.00)	0.08*** (0.00)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)		0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)		0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)		0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)		0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)
Constant	-0.20** (0.07)	0.10 (0.08)	-2.24*** (0.09)	-2.34*** (0.10)	-0.54*** (0.08)	-2.65*** (0.09)	-2.56*** (0.10)
Observations	72,464	66,673	66,673	66,673	66,673	66,673	66,673

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country and year FE are included.

Figure 5 shows the predicted probability of supporting the radical right for each of the sectors. Sectors are ordered by descending order of communication skill dexterity such that those sectors that rely least on communication and most on manual dexterity are on the right end of the figure. The probabilities are calculated off the results reported in Model 3 such that all other variables are held constant at their mean value. The figure shows that those working in a sector that requires a high level of communication skills (e.g., clerks, professionals) are less likely to support the radical right. Although not shown directly here, the converse is true with respect to manual skills. Those working in the three sectors that rely most on manual skills (least on communication skills) – elementary jobs, machine operators, and crafts – are those with the highest likelihood of supporting radical right parties. The results are therefore consistent with our first hypothesis.

Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities of support for the radical right by sector




Note. Predicted probabilities with robust 95% confidence intervals based on probit regression of voting for radical right parties. The analysis draws on Model 3 in Table 2. Sectors are organized in descending order of communication skill dexterity.

Next, we compute the predicted probability of support for the radical right separately for men and women within each sector based on the same model. Figure 6 shows a clear pattern by skill whereby as above, communication requirement is negatively correlated with support for radical right. It also shows that within each sector men are somewhat more likely than women to support the radical right. This effect of gender irrespective of labor-market circumstances is consistent with explanations mentioned above such as the nature of extreme right parties, or their anti-feminist values.

Importantly, the figure also presents the gender segregation of the labor market within each sector. This is reflected in the bars that mark the fraction of men among workers in the sector. The figure shows three general areas that exhibit major segregation by gender. First is senior officials and managers (Sector 1) -- this communication intensive sector is heavily dominated by men. Second is Sectors 4 and 5: clerks and service workers. These sectors, too, rely on communication skills but are heavily dominated by women. Lastly, the three most manual sectors: crafts, machine and plant operators, and elementary (7, 8, and 9). The former two are distinctly male dominated while in the latter (mostly due to domestic helpers) women are the majority. Overall, though, the three sectors combined are male dominated: drawing on ESS data (2002-2016), 69% of those working in manual sectors are men. Thus, the greater tendency to support the radical right among manual workers observed at the micro level, combined with the fact that more men than women occupy manual jobs come together to higher rate of support for the radical right among men compared to women.

Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities of support for the radical right by sector and gender



Note. The analysis draws on Model 3 in Table 2. Sectors are organized in descending order of communication skill dexterity. Bars, and numbers on top of them, show the percentage of male workers in each sector.

Our interpretation of the results is that working in a sector that requires communication skills serves as a shield of protection for workers against either losing one's job for an immigrant worker or having one's wage decline due to immigration or trade and thus reduces their support for radical right parties. Having a manual-skill job has the opposite effect.

5.4. Revisiting the gender gap: The political context

Having examined aggregate trends and individual-level behavior, the present section revisits the original gender gap in support for the left and analyzes it in the context of the party system and the gender-segregation of the manual labor market. Recall that our second hypothesis linked the gender gap to economic positions of the left. In particular, it stated that where the radical right is a viable alternative for voters and the mainstream left takes centrist policy positions, greater gender segregation (i.e., male domination) of manual sectors will be associated with a smaller (more "modern") gender gap. Put differently, the more jobs in immigration-vulnerable sectors are occupied by men, *fewer men compared to women* will support the left, contingent on the economic position of the left.

To evaluate this hypothesis, we draw on the ESS (2002-2016) and the Chapel Hill expert survey. Specifically, we estimate the gender gap on the left as a function of gender segregation of manual sectors and economic position of the mainstream left party in the elections preceding the survey as well as their interaction, both measured as described in Section 4.1. We also control for the position of both the mainstream left and the radical right on the second dimension (Kitschelt

1994)⁹ as well as the economic position of the radical right and include country and year fixed effects. We split our cases to two -- those in which the radical right secured at least a single parliamentary seat in parliament in the elections preceding the survey and therefore was arguably a viable option for voters, and those where it did not.

Results of this estimation (reported in Model 2 in Table 3) present a clear picture. Where the radical right secured at least a single parliamentary seat in the previous elections, the constitutive term of male domination of manual sectors is positively associated with the gender gap, yet its interaction with the economic position of the left is negative (note that results hold in the baseline Model 1 as well). Figure 7a presents the marginal effect of male domination of the manual sectors on the gender gap in support for the left (on the vertical axis), modified by the economic position of the largest left-wing party in the election preceding the survey (on the horizontal axis). All other variables are held constant at their respective mean. The results are based on the full model reported in the second column of Table 3. Where the mainstream left takes a traditional social democratic position (on the left side of the picture), greater male domination of the manual labor market translates to a larger gender gap in support for the left. This positive correlation implies that where more men compared to women work in manual jobs, more men compared to women support the left. As we move to the right on the horizontal axis and social democratic parties take more centrist economic positions, this relationship fades away

⁹ We use the CHES 0–10 GAL-TAN question that focuses on questions of rights, freedoms and morality.

-- greater occupational vulnerability among men does not translate to greater support for the left among men compared to women. Thus, in the presence of the radical right that presents itself as an alternative to dislocated interests, mainstream left parties that support centrist policy positions enjoy lower levels of support among male voters relative to female voters compared with their counterparts that pursue leftist policies. The magnitude of the effects is substantial. Given high male domination of manual sectors (one standard deviation above the mean), a shift in the economic position of the left toward the center (from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above it) is associated with a decline of 13.9 percentage points in the gender gap.

Conversely, where the radical right is not a viable alternative for voters (Model 3 in Table 3), neither ideological placement of the mainstream left nor gender segregation of the manual labor market affect gender patterns of the vote -- the gender gap is unaffected. This is also evident in analysis of substantive effects which we conducted (not reported here). Overall, then, our second hypothesis finds support in the data.

We turn to our third hypothesis, which focuses on the ideological distance between the left and the radical right. Our hypothesis stated that where the economic positions of the two are relatively similar, the more jobs in immigration-vulnerable sectors are occupied by men, *fewer men compared to women* will support the left. When the two are farther apart from each other, however, voters are less likely to shift their support. In other words, we expect a negative relationship between male domination of manual sectors and the gender gap where parties are

clustered together but a positive one where their positions are distinct.

To test this hypothesis, we repeat the exercise above with the gender gap on the left as a dependent variable and focus on labor market segregation as modified by the economic distance between the left and the radical right. As above, party positions are measured in the elections immediately preceding the survey, and the model controls for party positioning on second-dimension and includes country and year fixed effects.

Model 4 in Table 3 reports the result of this estimation, and based on the raw results presented in the table, Figure 7b presents substantive effects. The results in the table show a negative albeit statistically insignificant coefficient of male domination in manual sectors and a positive interaction term between male domination and economic distance. The figure shows the contingency of the relationship. On the horizontal axis is the economic distance between the two parties, and on the vertical one the marginal effect of labor market segregation. The effect is as predicted, though statistical significance is weaker than above. Let us begin with the right hand side of the figure. Where the distance between left and the radical right is substantial, a large number of men compared to women working in manual sectors is associated with a large number of men compared to women supporting the left. As we move leftward and the distance between the two declines, greater male domination of manual sectors is not associated with greater support for the left by men compared to women. Put differently, where the left and the radical right present each their version of relatively centrist economic policies, greater occupational vulnerability of men does not translate to greater support for the left by men.

Finally, to complete the picture, we examined the pull factor alone. Analogous to Model 3, Model 5 examines the effect of male domination in the manual labor market as modified by the economic position of the radical right. As above, the analysis controls for second dimension and country and year fixed effects. Neither the constitutive terms nor the interaction are statistically significant.

In sum, our first contextual hypothesis finds support in the data while our second one finds partial support. Where more men work in manual jobs and are thus occupationally vulnerable vis-s-vis immigration, more men than women support the left if the left holds on to its traditional positions and if the left and the radical right hold distinct economic positions. This finding attest to the importance of push factors as well as the combination of push and pull. Where both the left and the radical right moderate their positions, i.e., when they shift their economic positions toward the center, the radical right successfully presents itself as a substitute for the left in guarding dislocated interests of occupationally vulnerable manual workers. And while our analysis in the previous section shows that the radical right is successful in presenting itself as a substitute guardian of workers' interests, our contextual analysis suggests that in combination with the position of the left, the economic position it takes can modify the relationship between the gender segregation of the manual labor market and the gender gap in vote choice on the left. Put differently, the position of the radical right alone might not draw men working in manual jobs to abandon the left, but combined with a centrist left it can do so.


Table 3. Gender gap in support for the left

	Gender gap for the left				
	H2			H3	
	RR present		RR not present	RR present	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Male domination of manual sectors	0.64*	1.13***	-0.02	-0.21	-0.12
	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.14)	(0.32)
Economic position of left	0.04	0.07**	0.01		-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)		(0.01)
Ec. position of left * male dom. of manual sectors	-0.20**	-0.34***	-0.04		
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)		
Cultural position of left		-0.03*	0.02	-0.02+	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Economic position of RR		-0.01			-0.01
		(0.01)			(0.02)
Cultural position of RR		-0.01+		-0.01	-0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Distance in ec.position b/w RR and Left				-0.02	
				(0.01)	
Distance in ec. position * male dom. of manual sectors				0.10*	
				(0.05)	
Ec. position of RR * male dom. of manual sectors					0.02
					(0.05)
Country and year FEs	√	√	√	√	√
Constant	-0.12	0.01	-0.05	0.21+	0.24
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Observations	55	50	44	51	52
R-squared	0.72	0.79	0.47	0.69	0.67

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Note. Models 1-3 test H2. Models 4-5 test H3. All models include country and year fixed effects.

Figure 7. Estimated effect of labor market segregation on the gender gap across levels of economic positions of the left (H2) and distance between radical right and left on economic positions (H3)



Note. Marginal effect of male domination in manual sectors on the gender gap for the left (vertical axis) across levels of economic positions of the left (left-hand panel) and distance between economic position of the radical right and the left (right-hand panel). 95% confidence intervals are marked. Results are based on estimation reported in Table 3, Models 2 (H2) and 5 (H3).

5.5 Movement from the left to other parties and mobilization of non-voters

One might wonder whether this is truly about occupational vulnerability or perhaps some other factor leads men holding manual jobs to abandon the left and to favor the radical right. An additional way of empirically addressing this concern is an examination of whether a similar trend is observed among supporters of other party families. We first examined the gender gap in support for a party family that offers a different solution to dislocated interests: the radical left.¹⁰ The picture that evolves overtime is a modest and rather stable gap: men support radical left parties at a slightly higher rate than women. The gap declines from just below four percentage points in the early 1970s to over one percentage point in 2000 and onward.

We also examined whether men (and women) holding manual jobs abandon the left and in turn support *mainstream* right parties, namely Christian Democrats and Conservative party families, at higher rates. Our analysis of the Christian Democratic party family shows no secular trend for either female or male manual workers that differs from that of the general population. As for the Conservative party family, here, too, electoral support of men holding manual jobs follows closely that of the general public, albeit at a lower level. Overall, we find no evidence that men holding manual jobs disproportionately turn to mainstream right parties.

Importantly, we do not argue that the radical right is the new destination of all manual workers who abandoned the left or that the left is its only source of additional votes. In fact, studies have shown that the radical right draws on disenchanted voters or otherwise abstainers

¹⁰ The radical left party family includes all parties classified as communist and socialist-communist.

who feel alienated by the political establishment and mobilizes them to join the political process by casting a radical right ballot (Guiso et al. 2018). Rather, the combination of the aggregate analysis along with the individual-level analysis presented above jointly present a dynamic picture of occupational realignment in a multi-party system. The results suggest that men whose occupational position is particularly vulnerable to competition with immigrants or trade deserted the left. Also, such male voters turned out in high numbers for radical right parties but not for mainstream conservative parties. This is consistent not only with rates of support for and constituency composition of the radical right but also in the change of the gender gap on the left and in the composition of supporters of the left overtime.

5.6 Robustness analysis

We reconducted our analysis varying some of our empirical specifications. In a nutshell, our results hold across almost all variations.

Separate waves. We repeated our analysis utilizing ESS data from each of Waves 1 through 8 (2002-2016) separately. The results (reported in Appendix F) closely follow the results reported above.

Green parties. We included Green and ecological parties in the family of left parties (consistent with that used by Giger 2009) and reconducted our aggregate analysis (see Appendix F). The results of this categorization are nearly identical to those presented in our aggregate analyses, both in Figure 1 and in Figures 3 and 4.

We also rerun our individual-level analysis employing alternative specifications and utilizing multiple datasets:

Skill. As noted above, the import of skill rating percentiles from the US draws on relative sector sizes in the US economy and assumes that on average the economies included in the analysis are similar to the US economy in their relative sector sizes. To relax this admittedly stringent assumption, we rank-order the sectors on both communication and manual skill, eliminating percentiles. Results of this analysis are similar to, and in fact slightly stronger than, the results reported in our main analysis (see Appendix F), assuaging concerns over differences in labor market structure.

Retirees. We identified retirees (who are included in the analysis above based on their reported past occupation) by a dummy variable in models identical to Models 3 and 6 in Table 2. We also excluded them from the analysis altogether. The results are fully consistent with the original ones (see Appendix F).

Spouses and partners. We included in the analysis partner's education as well as their skill. Our results show that a partner's education is negatively correlated with the likelihood of supporting the radical right, and their skill is correlated with it in the same direction as one's own skill (see also Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2020). In both cases, however, our main result regarding the effect of one's own skill holds (see Appendix F).

Income. We examine the income distribution in the three most manual sectors against that in

other sectors. Our analysis shows that although on average income of communication-based sectors is higher than that in manual ones, the distributions overlap considerably. Most importantly, once income is included in the model, our results hold (see Appendix F).

6. Conclusion

What explains the secular trend in gender realignment of the vote over the past five decades? Past research documents various explanations for the gradual drift of women to the left. This study shows that voting behavior of men, and particularly men who hold manual jobs, contributes to the extensively documented change in the gender gap on the left.

The premises of our analysis are that (i) there are potentially several gender gaps in voting, (ii) these gaps may change due to changes in voting behavior of *both* women and men, and (iii) these changes take place within a dynamic party system. These premises allow us to link two well documented regularities analyzed separately to date -- the gender gap on the left and the rise of the radical right -- and thereby reach new insights regarding the gender gap in multi-party systems. We demonstrate that occupational vulnerability in the face of competition with immigrants and trade plays a role in this change, and identify those whose jobs require high manual (low communication) skill dexterity as particularly vulnerable. Manual workers -- most of whom are men -- abandon the left (compared to their female counterparts), and support the radical right.

Our study opens the door to exciting new research avenues. We find two extensions of

our analysis to be particularly interesting to follow in future research. The first extension has to do with occupational vulnerability. In our analysis, we point at communication skills as a key barrier to integration of immigrants and assume that occupations that require communication skill dexterity are harder for immigrants to find jobs in. Although a good proxy for integration potential of immigrants, the degree to which a particular language serves as a barrier for immigrants may vary depending on the diad of language at the host country and language in the country of origin. Due to historical or cultural ties and colonial history, some relevant host languages are widely spoken in some countries of origin, while others are not. Additionally, linguistic similarity varies across languages making some easier to get command of than others, depending on one's language of origin. Thus, a possible extension of our analysis might entail a more nuanced classification of languages required and those spoken by groups of immigrants in different countries.

The second extension has to do with party positions. In our analysis, we contextualized the realignment of the vote along gender and occupational lines using a well-established, albeit quite general indicator of party economic position. We show that the position of the mainstream left, as well as a combination of it and that of the extreme right, affect the sensitivity of the gender gap to occupational vulnerability. And while the left-right economic scale offers a helpful heuristic for party positions, one might seek to refine the analysis of party socio-economic policy position, as recent research goes beyond the unidimensional scale of more or less public spending. Parties differ in their emphasis: some focus on income while others on human capital

(Beramendi et al. 2015), some on benefits directed at insiders while others at outsiders, some on redistribution while others on social insurance (Häusermann 2018). A more nuanced analysis would take into consideration the different aspects of socio-economic policies pursued by different parties, and examine how they affect occupationally vulnerable workers.

References

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Online Appendix

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European Social Survey (ESS) (2002-2012)

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
	ESS1	ESS2	ESS3	ESS4	ESS5	ESS6	ESS7	ESS8
AT	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓
BE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CH	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
DE	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
DK	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
ES	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
FI	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
FR	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GB	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
GR	○	✓		✓	✓			
IE	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
IS		✓				✓		✓
IT	✓					✓		✓
LU	○	○						
NL	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NO	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PT	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
SE	○	○	○	○	✓	✓	✓	✓

Appendix B. Party classifications

Political parties that were awarded at least one parliamentary seat during the surveyed period are sorted into party families according to several party classifications: (1) Comparative political data set, (2) Norris, Pippa (2005), (3) Laver, M., Gallagher, M., & Mair, P (2011), and (4) The Parliament and Government Composition Database. Each party is given a numeric code where the first digit indicates the super family and the ones digit represents a specific party family. For example, 21 = Socialist 22 = Left/Socialist. The super party family Left is an aggregation of the parties that fall into the following categories: socialist, social democracy, left-socialist and communist-socialist. The super party family Radical Right is an aggregation of the parties which fall into the following categories: agrarian, radical right, right wing, populist, protest, and far right.

The four classifications are listed below.

- 1) Comparative Political Data Set. http://www.cpbs-data.org/images/Update2015/CPDS_Codebook_1960-2013.pdf (p.45)
- 2) Norris, Pippa. 2005. *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge University Press pp. 54-57.
- 3) Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair. 2011. *Representative government in modern Europe*. McGraw-Hill.
- 4) Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow. 2019. "Parliaments and Governments Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern Democracies. Development Version." [/](#).

Appendix C. Communication and manual skills

For our analysis of the radical right and in particular occupational vulnerability of native workers in the face of competition with immigrant workers, we utilize information about the degree to which different occupations require manual or communication skills. To do so, we draw on the dataset constructed by D'Amuri et al. (2014) and adjust it to our needs. D'Amuri et al. (2014) draw on O*NET (Occupational Information Network) characterization of occupations developed by the US Department of Labor and in a series of steps adapt them to the European context. We specify these steps below.

O*NET assigns scores indicating the importance of different tasks for a total of 339 occupations distinctly recognized by Standard Occupation Classification (SOC). Tasks vary widely, and include things such as lifting heavy boxes, using statistical software, driving a truck, and the like. D'Amuri et al. (2014) lump the seventy-eight tasks into five broader skill categories: communication, mental, complex, manual and routine. Communication skills, for example, include oral comprehension, oral expression, speech clarity, written comprehension and written expression while wrist-finger speed, manual dexterity, and trunk strength are categorized as 'manual'. They then convert each of the five broad skill scores into a percentile by sector, describing the particular skill intensity of the occupation compared to others. For example, laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport are given a manual score of 87, meaning that eighty-seven percent of workers in the 2000 US Census use manual skills less intensively than laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport. Once each of the 339 occupations is assigned a percentile score, D'Amuri et al. lump occupations to twenty one occupational categories according to the ISCO classification of occupations. The percentile score of each such category is a weighted average of the scores of the relevant original occupations where the weights are the proportion of the US population in each of the 339 ISCO occupations according to the 2000 US Census. Lastly, we collapse D'Amuri et al.'s twenty-one occupational categories into ten sectors using a broader ISCO sector classification whereby the skill percentile score of each sector is the simple average of the occupational categories that make up the sector. It is these percentiles that we incorporate into the survey data.

While the ESS occupation code overlaps with the ISCO sector code, EB uses somewhat different occupational categorization, one that ranges between 110 and 540, with the first digit indicating an unspecified classification of a sector. The matching was done by comparing the descriptions of the EB occupation categories to the individual occupation categories in the ESS and implementing the first digit of the ESS category (the ISCO sector classification) as the sector for the EB category. For example, in the EB, 322 is described as 'employed position not at a desk but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman...'. In the ESS, health care assistants are coded as 5321, cooks are coded as 5120, Police as 5412, and Firemen as 5411, therefore occupation 322 in the EB dataset is coded as Sector 5.

Note that the import of skill scores developed based on the US economy to the European sphere rests on two assumptions. First, it assumes that occupations that require manual (communication) skills in the US require similar type of skill set in Europe. This seems like a reasonable assumption given the general technological similarity between the two. Second, given that preliminary scores are turned into percentiles based on the number of workers per sector our particular procedure assumes that the relative size of sectors is similar across the two. We relax this assumption by rank ordering the usage of different skills across sectors rather than utilizing percentiles. Our results are similar across specifications (see Robustness section).

Appendix D. Survey question wording

Variable	Description
Eurobarometer	
CNTRY	The variable CNTRY identifies in which country a particular interview was conducted. Usually the selection of countries was restricted to member states of the European Community/European Union. The number of surveyed member states grew from five in 1970 up to 16 (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom) in 1999. Concerning the United Kingdom, we have information on Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland), concerning Germany, information was collected on West Germany.
Year	Year of observation
VOTEINT	Respondents to the survey were asked, “If there were a general election tomorrow (say if the contact is under 18 years: and you had a vote), which party would you support?” observations were allotted according to the variable “PRTY”. Each country has PRTY choices according to relevance.
European Social Survey	
CNTRY	The variable identifies which country a particular interview was conducted in. In our analysis we made use of 18 Western European countries that were surveyed between 2002 and 2016. Countries included: Switzerland, Iceland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom
PRTVTxcntry	Given that respondents previously answered that they voted in the last election they were asked, “Which party did you vote for in that election?” The variable is country and round specific where <i>x</i> denotes which round and version of the question (values: blank for first, <i>a</i> for second, <i>b</i> for third etc.) Cntry denotes the country which the variable pertains to, for example, <i>at</i> is Austria, <i>be</i> is Belgium and so on. The vote choice variable for Austria (Surveyed in rounds 1-3) looks like the following: PRTVTAT (Round 1 and 2), PRTVTAAT (Round 3).
ESSROUND	The variable identifies which round the survey was conducted for. ESS1 was conducted in 2002 with a new survey completed every two years, so that ESS2 was completed in 2004, ESS3 in 2006, ESS4 in 2008, ESS5 in 2010 and so forth.
Imdfetn	Respondents were asked, “[To what extent do you think [country] should allow people] of a different race or ethnic group from most [country]

	<p>people?” Respondents either answered, “allow many”, “allow some”, “allow few”, or “allow none”. We recoded these into categories into numeric values 1-4 where one takes the category of “allow many immigrants” and 4 is “allow none”.</p>
imdfetn	<p>Respondents were asked, “[To what extent do you think [country] should allow people] of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” Respondents either answered, “allow many”, “allow some”, “allow few”, or “allow none”. We recoded these into categories into numeric values 1-4 where one takes the category of “allow many immigrants” and 4 is “allow none”.</p>
Impcntr	<p>Description: Respondents were asked, “[Should country C] allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe Respondents either answered, “allow many”, “allow some”, “allow few”, or “allow none”. We recoded these into categories into numeric values 1-4 where one takes the category of “allow many immigrants” and 4 is “allow none”.</p>
Imbgeco	<p>Respondents were asked “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”</p> <p>Respondents gave a numeric answer between 0-10, where 10 indicated “good for the economy” and 0 indicated bad for the economy. We recoded this variable so answers ranged from 0-10, and 0 indicated good for the economy and 10 indicates bad for the economy</p>
Imueclt	<p>Respondents were asked “Would you say that [country’s] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”</p> <p>Respondents gave a numeric answer between 0-10, where 10 indicated “cultural life enriched” and 0 indicated cultural life undermined”. We recoded this variable so answers ranged from 0-10, and 0 indicated “cultural life enriched” and 10 indicates “cultural life undermined”.</p>
Imwbcnt	<p>Respondents were asked “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” Respondents gave a numeric answer between 0-10, where 10 indicated “better place to live” and 0 indicated “worse place to live”. We recoded this variable so answers ranged from 0-10, and 0 indicates “better place to live” and 10 indicated “worse place to live”.</p>
Rlgdgr	<p>Respondents were asked “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” Respondents gave a numeric answer between 0-10, where 10 indicated “not at all religious” and 0 indicated “very religious”.</p>

Brncnr	Respondents were asked “Were you born in [country]?” A score of 1 indicated “Yes” and a score of 2 indicated “No”. We recoded this variable so that a score of 0 indicated “Yes” and a score of 1 indicated “No”.
Eduyrs	Respondents were asked, “How many years of full-time education have you completed?” Answers varied from 1-37 years.
Domicil	Respondents were asked, “Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?” They were given five choices, “a big city”, “suburbs or outskirts of big city”, “town or small city”, “country village” or “farm or home in countryside”. We recoded this variable so that 5 indicated, “a big city” and 1 indicated “farm or home in countryside”.
uemp3m	Respondents were asked “Have you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months” A score of 1 indicated “Yes” and a score of 2 indicated “No”. We recoded this variable so that a score of 0 indicated “No” and a score of 1 indicated “Yes”.
Mbtru	Respondents were asked, “Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organisation?” A score of 1 indicated “Yes, currently”, 2 indicated “Yes, previously” and 3 indicated “No”. We recoded this variable so that 1 indicates “Yes, currently” and 0 indicates “Yes, previously” and “No”.
Agea	Age of the respondent calculated from the year of birth (yrbrn) and the year of the interview. We dropped all observations for those respondents under the age 18 (age of suffrage).

Appendix E. Descriptive statistics

Individual-level analysis	ESS 2002-2016		
	N	Mean	SD
Manual	129163	44.77	18.32
Communication	129163	58.16	21.59
Male	129163	0.49	0.50
Age (18-102)	129163	51.33	16.86
Religiosity (0- not at all religious; 10- very religious)	129163	4.67	2.92
Education (Years of full-time education completed; 0- 56)	129163	12.95	4.28
Union member (0-not member; 1-member)	129163	0.30	0.46
Population density (1- countryside; 5-big city)	129163	3	1.21
Unemployed for > 3 months	129163	0.25	0.43
Foreign born	129163	0.05	0.22
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life (0-Cultural life enriched; 10-Cultural life undermined)	129163	4.07	2.44
Do not allow immig. of a different race (1-Allow many to come and live here; 4- Allow none)	129163	2.38	0.84
Immig. make country a worse place to live (0-Immig's make country better; 10-Immig's make country worse)	129163	4.84	2.23
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe (1- Allow many to come and live here; 4-Allow none)	129163	2.45	0.86
Immig. are bad for the economy (0-Good for the economy; 10-Bad for the economy)	129163	4.76	2.32
Macro-level analysis	ESS 2002-2016, CHES 1999-2014		
Male domination of manual sectors	113	0.36	0.16
Gender gap on the radical right	62	0.04	0.03
Gender gap on the left	119	-0.03	0.04
Economic position of mainstream left	100	3.44	0.83
Economic position of the radical right	54	6.19	1.29
GAL-TAN of mainstream left	100	3.61	0.82
GAL-TAN of the radical right	54	8.60	1.06

Table F1(a). Support for the radical right, ESS1 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.22*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.27* (0.13)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.16)
Communication		-0.49** (0.17)	-0.35* (0.16)	-0.20 (0.25)			
Male x communication				-0.20 (0.25)			
Manual					0.51** (0.20)	0.35 (0.20)	0.12 (0.30)
Male x manual							0.33 (0.31)
Union member	-0.21* (0.10)	-0.24* (0.09)	-0.21* (0.09)	-0.21* (0.09)	-0.23* (0.09)	-0.21* (0.09)	-0.21* (0.09)
Education (yrs.)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Population density	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Age	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Age squared	0.00 (0.00)						
Religiosity	-0.01 (0.01)						
Unemployed for > 3 months	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
Foreign born	-0.16 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.16)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)		0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.24*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)		0.24*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)		0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Not allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe			0.08*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)		0.09*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)		0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	-0.33 (0.26)	-0.00 (0.31)	-2.29*** (0.15)	-2.38*** (0.11)	-0.47* (0.24)	-2.62*** (0.19)	-2.52*** (0.26)
Observations	7515	6789	6789	6789	6789	6789	6789

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

Table F1(b). Support for the radical right, ESS2 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.22*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.18** (0.05)	0.25** (0.09)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.18** (0.05)	0.08 (0.11)
Communication		-0.54*** (0.10)	-0.35* (0.15)	-0.26 (0.22)			
Male x communication				-0.13 (0.15)			
Manual					0.60*** (0.12)	0.39* (0.17)	0.25 (0.25)
Male x manual							0.21 (0.18)
Union member	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)
Education (yrs.)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Population density	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age squared	0.00 (0.00)						
Religiosity	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.12** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)
Foreign born	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.21 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.21 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life1			0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)		0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Not allowing immigrants of a different race			0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)		0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)		0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)		0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)		0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Constant	-0.42 (0.25)	-0.18 (0.27)	-2.31*** (0.38)	-2.37*** (0.41)	-0.73** (0.25)	-2.67*** (0.30)	-2.61*** (0.29)
Observations	6938	6468	6468	6468	6468	6468	6468

Standard errors in parentheses, including country FE * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

Table F1c. Support for the radical right, ESS3 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.26*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.29** (0.10)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.13 (0.13)
Communication		-0.63*** (0.11)	-0.36*** (0.10)	-0.28 (0.14)			
Male x communication				-0.12 (0.18)			
Manual					0.71*** (0.12)	0.41*** (0.10)	0.27 (0.14)
Male x manual							0.20 (0.21)
Union member	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)
Education (yrs.)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Population density	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)						
Age squared	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.02* (0.01)						
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.20* (0.09)	0.19* (0.09)	0.19 (0.10)	0.19* (0.10)	0.19* (0.09)	0.19 (0.10)	0.19* (0.10)
Foreign born	-0.19** (0.07)	-0.23*** (0.07)	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.23*** (0.07)	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.18* (0.07)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)		0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)		0.07 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)		0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.18* (0.07)	0.18* (0.07)		0.18* (0.08)	0.18* (0.08)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)		0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Constant	-0.30 (0.46)	-0.01 (0.44)	-2.46*** (0.49)	-2.51*** (0.54)	-0.66 (0.53)	-2.84*** (0.56)	-2.79*** (0.53)
Observations	6611	6196	6196	6196	6196	6196	6196

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

Table F1(d). Support for the radical right, ESS4 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.28*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.35** (0.13)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.21 (0.18)
Communication		-0.57*** (0.11)	-0.39*** (0.08)	-0.34* (0.16)			
Male x communication				-0.06 (0.19)			
Manual					0.61*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.07)	0.25 (0.23)
Male x manual							0.22 (0.31)
Union member	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)
Education (yrs.)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Population density	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Age	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age squared	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.24* (0.09)	0.21* (0.11)	0.23 (0.12)	0.23 (0.12)	0.21* (0.11)	0.23 (0.12)	0.23 (0.12)
Foreign born	-0.09 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.16)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)		0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.11* (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)		0.11 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)		0.05** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)		0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)		0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Constant	-0.39 (0.31)	-0.04 (0.39)	-2.36*** (0.24)	-2.38*** (0.28)	-0.61* (0.30)	-2.75*** (0.20)	-2.68*** (0.18)
Observations	5644	4946	4946	4946	4946	4946	4946

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

Table F1(e). Support for the radical right, ESS5 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.22*** (0.06)	0.13 (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)	0.22** (0.07)	0.14* (0.07)	0.17** (0.06)	0.11 (0.09)
Communication		-0.73** (0.22)	-0.49* (0.19)	-0.41* (0.20)			
Male x communication				-0.10 (0.09)			
Manual					0.78** (0.26)	0.52* (0.23)	0.41 (0.23)
Male x manual							0.14 (0.09)
Union member	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Education (yrs.)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Population density	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Age	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
Age squared	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.19** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)	0.18* (0.07)	0.18* (0.07)	0.17** (0.06)	0.18* (0.07)	0.18* (0.07)
Foreign born	-0.25** (0.09)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.21 (0.11)	-0.21 (0.11)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.21 (0.11)	-0.21 (0.11)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)		0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)		0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)		0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries			0.16** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)		0.16** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)		0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Constant	-1.07*** (0.29)	-0.78** (0.27)	-3.51*** (0.18)	-3.55*** (0.17)	-1.51*** (0.37)	-4.00*** (0.34)	-3.96*** (0.34)
Observations	8305	7495	7495	7495	7495	7495	7495

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

Table F1(f). Support for the radical right, ESS6 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.27*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.44*** (0.13)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.06 (0.10)
Communication		-0.68*** (0.09)	-0.37*** (0.10)	-0.13 (0.13)			
Male x communication				-0.33 (0.17)			
Manual					0.75*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.12)	0.10 (0.14)
Male x manual							0.43* (0.21)
Union member	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)
Education (yrs.)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Population density	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.00 (0.00)						
Religiosity	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.11** (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.11** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)
Foreign born	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)		0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)		0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)		0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries			0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)		0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)		0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Constant	-1.19*** (0.20)	-0.98*** (0.23)	-3.73*** (0.30)	-3.88*** (0.26)	-1.68*** (0.23)	-4.12*** (0.28)	-3.98*** (0.31)
Observations	9786	9157	9157	9157	9157	9157	9157

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

Table F1(g). Support for the radical right, ESS7 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.19*** (0.05)	0.11 (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	0.38* (0.17)	0.12* (0.06)	0.14* (0.06)	-0.12 (0.09)
Communication		-0.74*** (0.13)	-0.42** (0.13)	-0.11 (0.26)			
Male x communication				-0.42 (0.23)			
Manual					0.79*** (0.16)	0.43** (0.16)	0.02 (0.31)
Male x manual							0.58* (0.26)
Union member	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)
Education (yrs.)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Population density	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age	0.01 (0.01)						
Age squared	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.17** (0.05)	0.15* (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)
Foreign born	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.19* (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.19* (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)		0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.18*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)		0.18*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)		0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)		0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)		0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Constant	-0.29 (0.27)	0.04 (0.35)	-2.71*** (0.39)	-2.90*** (0.48)	-0.70** (0.27)	-3.12*** (0.38)	-2.95*** (0.33)
Observations	9738	9118	9118	9118	9118	9118	9118

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

Table F1(h). Support for the radical right, ESS8 (Probit)

	Communication				Manual		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.24*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.16 (0.15)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.16 (0.12)
Communication		-0.54*** (0.15)	-0.33* (0.13)	-0.37* (0.18)			
Male x communication				0.04 (0.23)			
Manual					0.59*** (0.16)	0.36* (0.15)	0.34 (0.20)
Male x manual							0.04 (0.28)
Union member	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
Education (yrs.)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Population density	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Age	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.01* (0.01)						
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.18* (0.08)	0.16 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)
Foreign born	-0.20* (0.09)	-0.25** (0.09)	-0.21* (0.08)	-0.21* (0.08)	-0.25** (0.09)	-0.21* (0.08)	-0.21* (0.08)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)		0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.15** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)		0.15** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)		0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.14** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)		0.14** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)		0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Constant	-0.16 (0.27)	0.16 (0.29)	-2.41*** (0.28)	-2.39*** (0.28)	-0.39 (0.21)	-2.75*** (0.22)	-2.74*** (0.24)
Observations	9792	9096	9096	9096	9096	9096	9096

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country FEs included.

**Table F2. Support for the radical right
(Probit, incl. interaction between gender and anti-immigrant attitudes, ESS 1-8)**

	Cultural anti-immigrant attitudes		Economic anti-immigrant attitudes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	0.19** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)
Communication	-0.43*** (0.05)		-0.45*** (0.05)	
Manual		0.46*** (0.06)		0.48*** (0.06)
cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	2.54*** (0.16)	2.55*** (0.16)		
M * cultural anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)		
economic anti-immigrant attitudes			2.16*** (0.12)	2.16*** (0.12)
M * economic anti-immigrant attitudes			-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Union member	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)
Education (Yrs.)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Population density	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age squared	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
Unemployed for>3 months	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)
Foreign born	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)
Constant	-1.88*** (0.25)	-2.30*** (0.25)	-1.51*** (0.23)	-1.96*** (0.23)
Observations	66673	66673	66673	66673

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Country and year FEs included.

Table F3. Support for the radical right, ordered skill variables (Probit, ESS 1-8)

	Communication (ordered)				Manual (ordered)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Male	0.22*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.04)
Communication (ordered)		-0.07*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.01)			
Male x communication				-0.01 (0.01)			
Manual (ordered)					0.06*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.01)
Male x manual							0.02* (0.01)
Union member	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)
Education (yrs.)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Population density	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Age squared	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
Foreign born	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life			0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)		0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. of a different race			0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)		0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Immig. make country a worse place to live			0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)		0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Do not allow immig. from poorer countries outside Europe			0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)		0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)
Immig. are bad for the economy			0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)		0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)
Constant	-0.20** (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	-2.28*** (0.09)	-2.32*** (0.09)	-0.51*** (0.08)	-2.65*** (0.09)	-2.60*** (0.10)
Observations	72464	66673	66673	66673	66673	66673	66673

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note. Table E3 repeats the analysis in Table 2 but rank-orders the sectors on both communication and manual skill. Country and year FE are included.

Table F4. Support for the radical right (Probit, retirees excluded or incl. as dummy)

	(1) Communication, no retirees	(2) Manual, no retirees	(3) Communication, retirees dummy var.	(4) Manual, retirees dummy var.
Male	0.18* (0.07)	0.19* (0.07)	0.17** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)
Communication	-0.52* (0.24)		-0.49* (0.19)	
Manual		0.57* (0.29)		0.52* (0.23)
Retirees			0.00 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)
Union member	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Education (Yrs.)	-0.03+ (0.02)	-0.03+ (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Population density	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01+ (0.01)	-0.01+ (0.01)
Age squared	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Unemployed for>3 months	0.17* (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)	0.18* (0.07)	0.18* (0.07)
Foreign born	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.21+ (0.11)	-0.21+ (0.11)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Not allowing immigrants of a different race	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.09+ (0.05)	0.09+ (0.05)
Immigrants make country worse place to live	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Not allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0.20* (0.10)	0.20* (0.10)	0.16** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)
Immigration bad for country's economy	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Constant	-3.41*** (0.31)	-3.95*** (0.47)	-3.51*** (0.18)	-4.00*** (0.33)
Observations	5841	5841	7495	7495

Standard errors in parentheses⁺ $p < .1$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Note. Analysis is performed on ESS 5 (2010) as the retirees variable is available only for ESS 5 and ESS 2. Country FEs are included.

Table F5(a). Support for the radical right (Probit, incl. partner's education, ESS 1-8)

	(1)	(2)
Male	0.15*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)
Communication	-0.45*** (0.06)	
Manual		0.48*** (0.07)
Education (Yrs.)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Partner's education	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
Union member	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)
Population density	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Age squared	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Unemployed for>3 months	0.10** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)
Foreign born	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Not allowing immigrants of a different race	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)
Immigrants make country worse place to live	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Not allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Immigration bad for country's economy	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Constant	-1.86*** (0.28)	-2.31*** (0.26)
Observations	45426	45426

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note. Manual and communication coefficients keep their significance when adding partner's education. $r(\text{respondent's education, partner's education}) = .53$ ($p < .001$).

Table F5(b). Support for the radical right (Probit, incl. partner's occupation, ESS 1-8)

	(1)	(2)
Male	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
Communication	-0.31*** (0.04)	
Partner's comm.	-0.00** (0.00)	
Manual		0.35*** (0.04)
Partner's manual		0.00* (0.00)
Union member	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)
Education (Yrs.)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Population density	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
Unemployed for>3 months	0.10** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)
Foreign born	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Not allowing immigrants of a different race	0.15*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)
Immigrants make country worse place to live	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Not allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Immigration bad for country's economy	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Constant	-2.22*** (0.35)	-2.76*** (0.31)
Observations	44956	44956

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note. Manual and communication coefficients keep their significance when adding partner's occupation. $r(\text{respondent's communication skill score, partner's communication skill score}) = .65$ ($p < .001$).

Table F6. Support for the radical right (Probit, with household income, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016)


	2004 (ESS2)		2008 (ESS4)		2012 (ESS 6)		2016 (ESS8)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Male	0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.34*** (0.07)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)
Communication	-0.37* (0.17)		-0.38*** (0.09)		-0.37*** (0.11)		-0.31* (0.13)	
Manual		0.42* (0.20)		0.38*** (0.10)		0.39** (0.13)		0.32* (0.14)
Household's net income	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Union member	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.13** (0.05)
Education (yrs.)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Population density	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age squared	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Religiosity	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Unemployed for > 3 months	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.19 (0.12)	0.19 (0.12)	0.09* (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.13* (0.07)	0.14* (0.07)
Foreign born	-0.16 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)
Immigrants undermine country's cultural life	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Do not allow immig. of a different race	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.11 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Immig. make country a worse place to live	0.06* (0.04)	0.06* (0.04)	0.06*** (0.05)	0.06*** (0.06)	0.08*** (0.04)	0.08*** (0.04)	0.07*** (0.05)	0.07*** (0.05)

Do not allow immig. from poorer countries	(0.02) 0.05	(0.02) 0.05	(0.01) 0.21***	(0.01) 0.21***	(0.02) 0.19***	(0.02) 0.19***	(0.01) 0.12*	(0.01) 0.12*
Immig. are bad for the economy	(0.03) 0.04**	(0.03) 0.04**	(0.06) 0.02	(0.06) 0.02	(0.03) 0.06**	(0.02) 0.06**	(0.05) 0.05*	(0.05) 0.05*
Constant	(0.01) -2.15***	(0.01) -2.54***	(0.01) -2.16***	(0.01) -2.52***	(0.02) -3.77***	(0.02) -4.14***	(0.02) -2.20***	(0.02) -2.50***
Observations	(0.41) 5712	(0.34) 5712	(0.17) 4361	(0.14) 4361	(0.30) 8611	(0.26) 8611	(0.25) 9510	(0.20) 9510

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


Note. Controlling for income does not change the significant effect of communication and manual skills on the vote.

Figure F1. Gender gap on the left, including Green parties



Note. The gender gap for the left party family and for environmental parties. Parties included in the left party family are: socialist, social democratic, left-socialist and parties that are included in the green party family are: environmental and green ecologist parties. See A2 for more information about party classifications.

Figure F2. Gender gap for the left, including green parties differentiated by radical right presence in parliament



Note. The gender gap on the left party family in countries where radical right parties gained at least a single seat in parliament (red) and countries where the radical right has no presence in parliament (black). Parties included in the left party family are: socialist, social democratic, left-socialist, environmental and green ecologist parties. See A2 for more information about party classifications.